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Introduction
The political role of sport is obvious these days, despite idealistic 
claims of international sports governing bodies that sport and politics 
are separate. Nationalism has been present in modern sport from the 
moment it began to gain popularity. As a consequence, governments 
began to try to use sport to achieve political objectives. In the Cold 
War period, the Soviet Union and the United States used sport as a tool 
to further their rival ideologies, while many African countries isolate 
the South African regime on the international stage. On the other hand, 
sport is also used by states as a means of achieving more positive goals 
in international relations. An example of sport being used as a means 
of rapprochement between hostile countries is the well-known “ping 
pong” diplomacy between the U.S. and communist China. In a quite 
similar manner, sport may be used to deepen political cooperation 
between states, or even to build political alliances. 
This article aims to investigate positive sports diplomacy directed at 
building political alliances, which is a relatively new field of research. 
The subject will be analysed in the light of a case study concerning 
the Games of New Emerging Forces. This sports event is usually seen 
as an example of resistance by some countries to the domination of 
the International Olympic Committee over international sport, but this 
research examines the issue from the perspective of establishing and 
strengthening the political alliance between the non-aligned countries. 
The Games of New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) were the result 
of an idea to use sport to create a forum of cooperation and draw 
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nations closer together. There are also views that the initiative was 
designed to shape the alliance between China and Indonesia, or that 
it was a Chinese attempt to strengthen its sphere of influence in the 
developing world.
The research aims to establish whether the GANEFO were in fact 
an attempt to create a political alliance, and possibly to define the 
leading country in that alliance. An attempt to assess this initiative in 
regards to its objectives will also be made. The investigation will also 
test the hypothesis that the GANEFO were the simultaneous result of 
independent sports diplomacies pursued by Beijing and Jakarta.
The Genesis and Concept of the GANEFO
The circumstances of the organisation of the first Games of New Emerging 
Forces (also called the GANEFO I) are closely related to the Asian Games 
that were hosted by Indonesia in 1962. The government of Indonesia refused 
to allow athletes from Taiwan and Israel, who were willing to compete in 
the event, to enter the country. Both states had been invited to participate in 
the Asian Games, but reactions by the PRC and some Arab states prompted 
Indonesia’s refusal to issue visas to athletes from those countries.1 It is also 
raised speculation that Indonesia’s president Ahmed Sukarno was hoping to 
receive financial support from Middle Eastern countries and China, which he 
would later use to fulfil his ambition of uniting the non-aligned states.2 Even 
though the visa issue was nothing new in international sport, particularly 
concerning Israeli citizens, the International Olympic Committee reacted 
particularly sternly and suspended the Indonesian National Olympic 
Committee in February 1963, on the grounds that it had not protested against 
its government’s discriminatory policy. The suspension was approved by the 
IOC by five votes, and was open-ended,3 but was to be lifted if Indonesia 
assured the IOC that such a situation would not happen again.4 In response, 
Indonesia withdrew from the International Olympic Committee.
1 F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” International 
Journal of the History of Sport, vol. 19, no. 2, 2002, pp. 327–328.
2 C. Little, “Games of New Emerging Forces,” in: J. Nauright, C. Parrish (eds.), Sports 
around the World: History, Culture and Practice, ABC Clio, 2012, p. 223.
3 R. Field, The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in 
Sport: An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO, University of Manitoba, 2011, p. 5.
4 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 4, 
1965, p. 173.
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The IOC justified its decision by claiming that both the Committee and 
international sports federations were wholly against any attempts to use 
politics, race or religion as a tool to manipulate sport, particularly in regard to 
preventing the free movement of athletes and officials between IOC states.5 
The determined and severe reaction of the International Olympic Committee 
was explained in various ways. It appeared legitimate, but previous examples 
of discrimination against athletes from Israel and Taiwan did not result in 
such a fierce reaction. The Asian Games were held under the auspices of the 
IOC, and this might have played a role, as could the fact that this was not the 
first time that Indonesia had refused entry to athletes of particular nations. 
It is also claimed that Indonesia’s relatively low standing in international 
sport (compared, for example, to France or the U.S.) might have influenced 
the Committee.6 According to David Miller, the IOC’s tough attitude might 
also have stemmed from earlier events in Jakarta, where a crowd attacked 
the Indian embassy and a hotel at which Indian IOC member Guru Dutt 
Sondhi was staying. India was supporting the potential withdrawal of IOC 
patronage of the Asian Games.7 Demonstrations took place after Sondhi 
publically criticised Indonesia for not allowing Taiwanese and Israeli athletes 
to compete in the event,8 and Sondhi had to leave Indonesia in a hurry.9 All in 
all, a situation that appeared marginal led to important and significant results. 
Many researchers suggest that the Games of New Emerging Forces led 
directly to the conflict between Indonesia and the IOC, the suspension of 
Indonesia NOC, and its ultimate withdrawal from the Olympic Movement. 
However, the situation appears to be more complicated. After Indonesia’s 
withdrawal from the Olympic Movement, the country’s ministry of sport 
announced the organisation of a new sports event in which “imperialists and 
colonists” would not participate, under the name GANEFO. The event was 
predominantly for states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, along with the 
5 R. Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games: With Epilogue, 1976-1980, University of 
California Press, 1981, p. 80; F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics 
and Diplomacy,” in: J.A. Mangan, F. Hong (eds.), Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present, 
Routledge, 2003, p. 328.
6 R. Espy, op. cit., p. 80.
7 D. Miller, Historia igrzysk olimpijskich i MKOl. Od Aten do Pekinu 1894–2008, Rebis, 
2008, p. 192.
8 R. Lutan, F. Hong, “The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO—A Case Study,” in: 
F. Hong (ed.), Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism: The Asian Games, Routledge, 2007, 
p. 28.
9 E.T. Pauker, op. cit., p. 172.
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communist countries. Indonesia also claimed that it was time for the newly 
emerging countries to revolt, in order to destroy the spirit and structure of an 
international sports movement it described as being directed by “imperialist 
and colonists.”10 Ahmed Sukarno, often described as a founder of the 
GANEFO, said the event was directed against the old order,11 personified by 
the IOC. The GANEFO, he argued, were needed for the emerging powers.12 
However, according to R. Lutan and F. Hong, the idea for the Games of New 
Emerging Forces was already being floated in September 1962, in response 
to Sondhi’s criticism.13 According to this view, the GANEFO would have 
been held regardless of the conflict between Indonesia and the IOC, which 
only accelerated developments. 
The Indonesian Perspective
The GANEFO preparatory conference was held in Jakarta in April 1963, 
shortly after Indonesia withdrew from the IOC. Representatives of China, 
Cambodia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Pakistan, North Vietnam, the 
United Arab Emirates and the Soviet Union participated, while observers 
were sent by Ceylon and Yugoslavia. The participants discussed and agreed 
upon the GANEFO’s objectives. The event was to be based on the spirit 
of the Bandung Conference, and on Olympic ideals. It was also stated that 
the GANEFO aimed to develop sports in the participating countries, and 
to cement friendly relations among them.14 Fostering self-awareness of the 
participating nations was also raised.15 It was decided that the new event 
was, like the Olympic Games, to be held once every four years, beginning in 
1963. Unlike the Olympics, the GANEFO were to be politically relevant not 
only in practice, but also according to the design. As Sukarno said, “sport has 
something to do with politics. And Indonesia now proposes to mix sport with 
10 F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” in: 
J.A. Mangan, op. cit., pp. 328–329.
11 A.E .Senn, Power, Politics and the Olympic Games: A History of Power Brokers, Events, 
and Controversies That Shaped the Games, Taylor and Francis, 1999, p. 130.
12 S. Creak, “Representing True Laos in Post-Colonial Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics in 
the Globalization of Sport,” in: K. Bromber, B. Krawietz, S. Maguire (eds.), Sport Across 
Asia: Politics, Cultures and Identities, Routledge, 2013, p. 109.
13 R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., pp. 28, 30.
14 R. Espy, op. cit., pp. 80–81, F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics 
and Diplomacy,” in: J.A. Mangan, op. cit., p. 329.
15 U.U. Paetzold, “The Music in Pencak Silat Arts Tournaments Is Gone—A Critical 
Discussion of the Changes in the Performance Culture,” in: U.U. Paetzold, P.H. Mason 
(eds.), The Fighting Art of Pencak Silat and Its Music: From Southeast Asian Village to 
Global Movement, Brill, 2016, p. 101.
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politics.”16 It was planned that, after the event, a conference should be held, 
in order to cement the political unity of the participating countries.17 These 
official objectives speak for themselves and justify analysis of this sports 
event from the perspective of political alliance building. 
The GANEFO reference to the Bandung Conference is very important. 
The conference was held in Indonesia in 1955, and attended by representatives 
of African and Asian countries with the aim of establishing principles of 
cooperation within the Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia’s president 
Ahmed Sukarno and other initiators wanted the movement to foster these 
countries’ freedom and defend against exploitation and suppression. The 
ideals of the GANEFO were to sustain this spirit. As the GANEFO charter 
stated, the new emerging forces would develop the community of nations, 
in the spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations, 
which guaranteed respect to each national identity and sovereignty, enhanced 
friendship, and fostered cooperation towards lasting peace between nations 
and the brotherhood of man.18 The GANEFO were therefore meant to 
bring the countries of Asia, Africa and South America closer, by promoting 
economic and cultural cooperation within the developing world.19 They were 
also supposed to foster the development of sport in participating countries, 
and most of all to stimulate sports competition between their young people, 
in order to develop and consolidate friendly relations.20 Such claims reflect 
typical objectives of public diplomacy, stimulating and fostering proximity 
and cooperation between nations through grassroots contacts, known as 
people to people diplomacy. 
The GANEFO are often described as an act of solidarity of the developing 
world against “the imperialist oppressors.”21 Taking into consideration the 
motivation of Indonesia and Sukarno, offended by the decision of the IOC, 
it is hard not to agree with such a statement. The concept of the GANEFO is 
sometimes described as an attempt to produce an alternative to the Olympic 
16 R. Roberts, J. Olson, Winning Is the Only Thing: Sports in America since 1945, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992, p. 195.
17 R. Field, op. cit., p. 9.
18 R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., p. 30.
19 M. Amara, “Olympic Sport and Internationalism Debates in the Arab-Muslim World,” in: 
H. Preuss, K. Liese (eds.), Internationalism in the Olympic Movement: Idea and Reality 
between Nations, Cultures, and People, VS Research, Wiesbaden, 2011, p. 42.
20 R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., p. 30.
21 C. Brewster, K. Brewster, Representing the Nations: Sport and Spectacle in Post-
Revolutionary Mexico, Routledge, 2010, p. 47.
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system,22 which can also be associated with Sukarno’s hopes of establishing 
a general new world order.23 These concepts referred to a dichotomy between 
the old forces and the emerging forces, which, as Sukarno stated during the 
GANEFO Congress, included all new powers in the world which fought, 
struggled and worked for the new world.24 Uniting the new emerging forces 
and stressing their presence on the world scene appears to have been the key 
motivation.25 The new sports and political initiative was directed most of all 
against the West, which may be associated with Sukarno’s personal hostility 
to colonialism and everything that it represents, while the international sports 
governing structures were seen as a tool in hands of the post-colonial West. 
The entire GANEFO concept was therefore deeply ideological as well. 
The GANEFO were meant to combine sport and politics. According 
to Sukarno, they were to foster Indonesia’s political aims, including world 
friendship and peace.26 This and the other objectives described above suggest 
that the GANEFO may be perceived as an example of sports diplomacy 
directed at shaping a political alliance of non-aligned countries, which 
remained outside the Cold War conflict. Sport was meant to be a tool to 
support the establishment of this alliance, through a periodical event that was 
at the same time competition for mainstream of international sport. 
Although the GANEFO were meant to represent the developing world, 
the organisers’ attitude towards the communist bloc was generally positive, 
and the Soviet Union was engaged from the beginning.27 In fact, Sukarno 
perceived socialist states as new emerging forces as well. The idea of “new 
forces” was not directly connected to particular countries, but to “forces” 
that could even be present within the former colonial empires. As a result 
of this attitude, the Netherlands, for example, participated in the GANEFO 
I. Such a “softened” approach to the issue stemmed partly from the lack 
of consent between the engaged countries about the political goals of the 
22 A. Hietanen, “The New International Sports Order: An Appraisal,” in: M. Ilmarinen (ed.), 
Sport and International Understanding, Springer-Verlag, 1984, p. 105.
23 M.A. Garcia, Secrets of the Olympic Ceremonies, Myles A. Garcia, 2014, p. 162.
24 R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., p. 28.
25 R. Espy, op. cit., p. 82.
26 F. Hong, L. Zhouxiang, The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and 
Champions, Routledge, 2013, p. 42.
27 K. Young, K. Wamsley, Global Olympic: Historical and Sociological Studies of the 
Modern Games, Elsevier, 2005, p. 73; R. Boden, “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to 
Indonesia,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 118.
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initiative.28 On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its satellite states 
may have participated in the GANEFO only because they did not want to 
lose their connections with Asian and African countries. Still, European 
communist states kept their distance, for fear of losing their influence in 
the IOC.29 Soviet involvement also revealed the bloc’s will to facilitate the 
GANEFO message. For example, USSR officials proposed the inclusion of 
Olympic ideals, while China opposed such a stance.30
From the Indonesian perspective, the GANEFO were important not only 
in building political alliances, but also for nation-branding. According to E. 
Pauker, by hosting the first GANEFO Indonesia showcased its capability to 
organise international sports events as an expression of resistance towards 
the imperialist West.31 This issue is associated with Sukarno’s ambitions of 
becoming the leader of the whole non-aligned movement. By hosting this 
event, he was showing the developing world that he was able to oppose the 
West.  
The Chinese Perspective
Indonesia is usually seen as the main initiator of the GANEFO, but 
communist China was also involved, albeit from the back row. This country 
also had its political objectives concerning the GANEFO. This applies to 
its conflict with international sports governing bodies, particularly the 
International Olympic Committee, and with Taiwan. The PRC withdrew 
from international sport after it was unable to have Taiwan thrown out. It was 
also in China’s interests to build an alliance with the non-aligned countries, 
but for different reasons than Indonesia. 
There are claims that it was communist China, rather than Indonesia, 
which was behind the GANEFO. This country was clearly interested 
in creating competition to the Olympic Movement, but at the same time, 
according to some authors, the Chinese preferred to lead from behind so 
they allowed Sukarno to use the idea.32 After Indonesia was banned from 
the Olympic Movement, one of the Chinese sports magazines reported on 
28 E.T. Pauker, op. cit., pp. 175–176.
29 A. Schuman, The Politics of Socialist Athletics in the People’s Republic of China, 
 1949 – 1966, doctoral dissertation, University of California, December 2014, p. 306.
30 Z. Quingmin, “Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspectives,” The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 8, no. 3/4, 2013, p. 219.
31 E.T. Pauker, op. cit., p. 177.
32 R. Espy, op. cit., p. 81; R. Roberts, J. Olson, op. cit., p. 195.
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the concept of GANEFO. It was said that Indonesian public opinion was 
supportive of proposals for an African-Asian Games and the establishment 
of a sports organisation, because it would show the unity of the developing 
world in its struggle against imperialism and colonialism.33 China’s prime 
minister Zhou Enlai also praised the GANEFO concept, writing in a letter 
that it was sustaining the national dignity of Indonesia and other African and 
Asian nations.34 China supported the organisation of the event financially as 
well, reportedly covering between 35% and 50% of the costs of international 
exchange associated with the GANEFO.35 Evidently, even if China did not 
initiate the event, it was heavily involved from the beginning. 
The motivation for China’s engagement in GANEFO was similar to that 
of Indonesia. It wanted to build a political alliance in the developing world, 
but as leader of the coalition. According to Xu Guoqi, China’s aim regarding 
the Games of New Emerging Forces was to raise its own international 
status.36 The event was meant to give China an opportunity to unite the 
developing world by shaping solidarity with states in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America.37 This was to give China a leading role among the emerging 
powers, in order to enhance its general political position, which would then 
allow it to compete with the two Cold War alliances. As Chinese sports 
minister He Long stated, “international sports exchanges have promoted 
mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of China and 
many foreign countries.”38 China’s ambition to lead the developing world 
was visible during preparations for the games, while the event itself was 
taking place, and afterward. For example, during a meeting of the Council 
of the GANEFO Federation in Beijing in 1965, He Long stated on behalf 
of the Chinese government, that “no matter what may happen in the world, 
the Chinese people will never shirk their international duty of aiding and 
supporting the peoples of the world in their revolutionary struggle against 
imperialism. We are determined to unite with all anti-imperialist peoples and 
carry forward to the end our revolutionary struggle against the imperialists 
33 Ibidem.
34 A. Schuman, “Elite Competitive Sport in the People’s Republic of China 1958–1966: The 
Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” Journal of Sport History, vol. 40, no. 2, 
p. 267.
35 A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 131. 
36 G. Xu, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008, Harvard University Press, 2008, 
p. 51.
37 A. Schuman, “Elite Competitive Sport…, op. cit., p. 260.
38 F. Hong, L. Zhouxiang, op. cit., p. 45.
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headed by the United States and their lackeys.”39 The speech obviously 
stressed the anti-imperialist attitude, but also revealed a desire to lead such 
an “anti-imperialist campaign.”
This all suggests that both China and Indonesia were engaging in the 
Games of New Emerging Forces in order to build a political alliance of the 
non-aligned states, but under their own leadership. In this light, cooperation 
could have been difficult, but it proved very smooth and effective. It is even 
claimed that a sport-based alliance between these countries was developed,40 
and GANEFO was its harbinger.41 Generally, friendship between Indonesia 
and China was emphasised throughout the event. China was supporting 
Indonesian anti-Western propaganda, for example when Chinese media 
reported the atmosphere of harmony, friendship and unity that dominated 
during the games.42 Apart from that, the final badminton match between China 
and Indonesia (where it is a national pastime) became a sort of a “diplomatic 
game.” When the Chinese player took the lead, he was instantly instructed by 
the Chinese delegation to lose.43 This was typical of China’s sports diplomacy 
at the time, which was used to create a positive climate for rapprochement 
between states. From the other side, the Chinese were welcomed very warmly 
by the Indonesian hosts. Sino-Indonesian cooperation constituted a second 
dimension of the political alliance through the GANEFO, alongside uniting 
the developing world. It is hard to say definitively whether the two countries 
were more interested in leading the emerging forces or in mutual cooperation, 
but it may appear that the closeness between China and Indonesia, highly 
visible during the GANEFO I, was rather a tool of achieving the ultimate 
goal of a political alliance. 
China’s engagement in the GANEFO also appears to have been designed 
to develop a positive international image through sporting prowess. 
39 G. Xu, op. cit., pp. 53–54, F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and 
Diplomacy,” International Journal of the History of Sport, vol. 19, no. 2, 2002, p. 327.
40 A. Beacom, International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New Mediators, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 116.
41 I. Henry, M. Al-Tauqi, “Evaluating Alternative Theoretical Perspectives on Sports Policy,” 
in: I. Henry et al. (eds.), Transnational and Comparative Research in Sport: Globalisation, 
Governance and Sport Policy, Routledge, 2007, p. 53.
42 S. Cornelissen, “Resolving ‘the South Africa Problem’: Transnational Activism, Ideology 
and Race in the Olympic Movement, 1960–91,” in: S. Cornelissen, A. Grundlingh (eds.), 
Sport Past and Present in South Africa: (Trans)forming the Nation, Routledge, 2012, 
p. 165; Z. Quingmin, op. cit., p. 219.
43 F. Hong, L. Zhouxiang, op. cit., p. 43.
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Throughout the event, the Chinese athletes performed very well and won 
the most medals,44 thus presenting their country as a leader of the global 
revolution.45 Owing to the GANEFO, China gained an opportunity to 
demonstrate its power and influence in the region.46 
The Organisation of the GANEFO
The first Games of New Emerging Forces were held in Jakarta in 
November 1963. The main slogan of the event was “Onward. No retreat.”47 
Its symbolism drew on the Olympic Games, for example there was 
a GANEFO torch relay which began in Java, and the event had its own 
flag and anthem. Most of the competitions were in Olympic disciplines, but 
others such as tennis, table tennis and badminton, yet to be adopted by the 
Olympics, were also included.48 Indeed, it might be surprising that there were 
so many references to the Olympic Games at an event that was designed to 
express opposition to the Olympic Movement.
It remains unclear how many athletes and from how many countries 
competed in the GANEFO I. Available data suggest that there were between 
2,000 and 3,000 participants, representing between 47 and 55 countries.49 
They included Palestine, which was not recognised by the IOC until 1995, 
an act which could itself be interpreted as symbolic of opposition towards 
the Olympic Movement.50
The Games of New Emerging Forces were a cultural as well as sports 
event. There were exhibitions of handcrafts and art from participating 
countries, as well as cultural events for the athletes, sightseeing, and a rally. 
All those activities were examples of people to people diplomacy, designed 
to create friendship between nations. Sukarno referred to this goal during his 
meeting with the Indonesian national team before the event. Moreover, he 
organised parties for the guest teams. Throughout the games, athletes had 
44 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I. Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” RAND, July 1964, pp. 21–22, 
www.rand.org.
45 N. Griffin, Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History behind the Game That Changed the 
World, Skyhorse Publishing, 2014, p. 134.
46 F. Hong, L. Zhouxiang, op. cit., p. 43.
47 A. Schuman, The Politics of…, op. cit., pp. 304–305.
48 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey…, op. cit., p. 172.
49 A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 132, G. Jarvie, Sport, Culture and Society: An Introduction, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 352; G. Modelski (ed.), The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the 
Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy, Australian National University, 1963 p. 87.
50 M. Amara, Sport, Politics and Society in the Arab World, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 8.
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informal contact, which was one of the elements of promoting understanding 
and friendship between nations. This was used not only by the Indonesian 
hosts, but also by the Chinese,51 and is a key issue in the analysis of sports 
and public diplomacy pursued through the GANEFO. If the event’s main 
goal was to build a political alliance of the non-aligned countries, creating 
closeness and solidarity between respective nations at the grassroots level 
appeared to be a tool to achieve this. 
The Response of the International Olympic Committee
The International Olympic Committee responded one month before the 
GANEFO. It did not exclude the possibility that athletes who competed in 
the GANEFO could be disqualified from the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 
1964. Technically, such disqualifications would be imposed by international 
sports federations, which would suspend the athletes for participating in an 
unapproved event. Additionally, international federations in athletics (IAAF) 
and swimming (FINA) did not recognise the communist People’s Republic 
of China and Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Athletes who competed in the 
same event as participants from those countries could have been banned not 
only from the Olympics, but also from all other mainstream sports events.52 
Such a response cast doubt on GANEFO’s potential success. 
In fact, the IOC’s response marginalised the GANFEO. Approximately 
20% of participants were from China or Indonesia, while most of the teams 
sent no more than five or six athletes. Countries such as the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and East Germany sent only unofficial 
teams that did not include first rate athletes, for fear of IOC reprisals.53 
Moreover, the communist states competed as either sports federations or 
youth organisations,54 and it is estimated that a third of all teams participating 
in the GANEFO were local or unofficial.55 It appeared that the International 
Olympic Committee had succeeded in reducing the risk of another 
51 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey…, op. cit., 
pp. 172, 182; R. Kropke, “International Sport and the Social Sciences,” Quest, vol. 22, 
no. 1, June 1974, p. 28.
52 A.E. Senn, op. cit., p. 131; R. Field, op. cit., pp. 15–16, K. Seon-Jong, Sport and Politics 
in the Republic of Korea, doctoral dissertation, University of Surrey, 1999, p. 158. 
53 R. Roberts, J. Olson, op. cit., p. 195–196.
54 A. Pasko, Sport wyczynowy w polityce państwa 1944–1989, Avalon, 2012, p. 231.
55 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey…, op. cit., p. 175,
116 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2016, no. 4
Michał Marcin Kobierecki
international sports movement being established and potentially threatening 
its own power.   
Nevertheless, while the GANEFO failed from the sports perspective, 
some organising and participating countries described it as a great success, 
mostly because of the number of participants.56 Chinese propaganda 
appeared to be particularly active in this respect, with newspapers reporting 
that the event had been a “brilliant epoch-making event in the history of 
international sports,” and that “in contrast to the imperialist-controlled 
Olympic Games, the GANEFO has no discriminatory rules or regulations.”57 
China appreciated the political significance of the event as well. Its leaders 
are understood to have perceived it as one of the most effective diplomatic 
missions in the 1960s, because it helped this newly-established communist 
state to receive support and build its position in the developing world.58 Thus, 
lack of success in the sports sense did not mean the complete failure of the 
GANEFO’s political dimension, at least according to formal statements. 
The Continuation of the GANEFO
Although the GANEFO I failed as a sports event, this did not end the 
idea of developing an alternative to the Olympic Movement and a political 
alliance of the non-aligned countries. Two days after the event, the 
Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) was organised,59 and 
two weeks later representatives of 36 countries met at the first meeting of the 
GANEFO Council and decided to establish the GANEFO Federation.60 The 
CONEFO was particularly important from the diplomatic perspective, as, 
according to ambitious plans, it was intended as an alternative to the United 
Nations. CONEFO was also meant to institutionalise the GANEFO and 
to ensure the event’s continuity.61 This political dimension of cooperation 
between developing world countries was the second element of building the 
56 G. Arum Yudarwati, “Indonesia,” in: T. Watson (ed.), Asian Perspectives on the 
Development of Public Relations: Other Voices, Palgrave Pivot, 2014, p. 53.
57 R. Roberts, J. Olson, op. cit., pp. 195–196.
58 F. Hong, L. Zhouxiang, “Politics, First, Competition Second: Sport and China’s Foreign 
Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s,” in: H.L. Dichter, A.L. Johns, Diplomatic Games: 
Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945, University Press of Kentucky, 
2014, p. 396.
59 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey…, op. cit., p. 176.
60 R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., p. 31.
61 E.T. Pauker, “GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey…, op. cit., 
pp. 179–180.
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alliance, alongside shaping positive attitudes between nations through sport. 
In this case, the goal was to create a forum at which decision-makers from 
respective countries would meet. 
The next Olympic Summer Games were scheduled for 1964. For 
the first time, they were to be held in Asia, with Tokyo as host city. This 
prompted the International Olympic Committee to propose recognising the 
Indonesian National Olympic Committee once again, so that the country 
would be allowed to compete in the Olympics. The only condition was that 
the Indonesian NOC should apologise and pledge that it would abide by the 
Olympic principles. It did so it in June 1964, and was quickly recognised by 
the IOC.62 However, there was another problem concerning the participation 
of Indonesia and North Korea in the Tokyo Olympics. As has been noted, 
most countries did not send their best athletes to the Games of New Emerging 
Forces for fear of disqualification by the IOC. Most disqualifications were 
later lifted, apart from those imposed by the IAAF and FINA. Because of 
this, 17 athletes, 11 from Indonesia and six from North Korea, arrived in 
Tokyo but were not allowed to enter the Olympic Village. The impasse 
ended one day before the opening of the Olympics, when both countries 
withdrew.63 This was further proof of the IOC’s victory over the GANEFO, 
despite the eventual recognition of the Indonesian NOC. What is more, it 
was the actions of the international sports federations, not the IOC, that led 
to the withdrawal of Indonesian and North Korean athletes. Apparently, the 
IOC perceived the GANEFO as a threat. It was even speculated that the 
GANEFO were among the reasons why Mexico City was elected to host the 
1968 Olympics,64 despite bids from Detroit and Lyon.65 Mexico City was 
the only candidate not associated with the Western bloc, thus safer from the 
IOC’s perspective.
The Asian GANEFO
The second Games of New Emerging Forces were to be held in 1967 in 
Cairo, four years after the GANEFO I, while Beijing was chosen as an 
alternative location. Earlier, in September 1965, a meeting of the GANEFO 
Council was held in the Chinese capital, at which 39 delegations decided 
62 R. Espy, op. cit., pp. 82–83.
63 J. Slater, “Tokyo 1964,” in: J.E. Findling, K.D. Pelle (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Modern 
Olympic Movement, Greenwood, 2004, pp. 168–169.
64 C. Brewster, “Changing Impressions of Mexico for the 1968 Games,” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, March 2010, vol. 29, p. 27.
65 C. Brewster, K. Brewster, op. cit., p. 46.
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to broaden the scope of the event. An Asian Committee was created, and it 
was decided that an Asian GANEFO would be organised in Cambodia in 
1966. The Asian Games of New Emerging Forces were also directed against 
the Olympic Movement, as was apparent by the clash of dates between this 
new event and the IOC-affiliated Asian Games.66 The Asian GANEFO were 
strongly supported by communist China, which provided financial aid and 
helped to build sports venues and train referees. China also led the Asian 
GANEFO Committee,67 which reveals Beijing’s deep engagement in the 
whole GANEFO idea and supports the hypothesis that its motivation was to 
build a political alliance under its own leadership. Without such motivation, 
it would not have been reasonable for China to lend such strong support to 
the organisation of sports event in another country. 
Despite ambitious plans, the GANEFO idea began to lose momentum. 
This was highly visible in 1965, when Cairo withdrew as GANEFO II host. 
Officials of the United Arab Republic were expecting China to finance the 
construction of a stadium, but their request was denied. The event was then 
moved to Beijing.68 It may be assumed that Egypt’s expectations were the 
result of China’s earlier generosity concerning GANEFO, but it appears that 
the Chinese approach had changed by that time. 
The Asian GANEFO were scheduled before the planned GANEFO II. 
They were held in November and December 1966 in Phnom Penh in Cambodia, 
at the same time as the Asian Games in Bangkok. Some 2,000 athletes from 
15 countries participated in the event, although some authors claim there 
were 17 participating countries. The event was very similar to the GANEFO 
I in three respects. Communist China dominated in the sporting aspect,69 the 
event was declared a great success by its organisers, and international sports 
federations again threatened to disqualify athletes who participated. This 
happened to North Korean track and field athletes, who were not allowed to 
compete in the Olympic Games in Mexico City.70 As a result, even Indonesia, 
66 R. Espy, op. cit., p. 109.
67 F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” International 
Journal..., op. cit., p. 331.
68 Ibidem.
69 F. Hong, X. Xiaozheng, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” in: 
J.A. Mangan…, op. cit., p. 331; G. Jarvie, op. cit., p. 352; R. Lutan, F. Hong, op. cit., p. 33.
70 B. Bridges, The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport, Global Oriental, 2012, p. 54.
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where Sukarno was overthrown in 1965, sent only 57 athletes to Cambodia, 
simultaneously sending a team to the Asian Games.71 
The GANEFO idea continued to decline. Communist China, at the 
time of the Cultural Revolution, withdrew as GANEFO II host in 1966,72 
leading to the ultimate collapse of the whole initiative. The developing world 
countries decided to move their attention to the Olympic Games, which in 
fact they also tried to use for political and diplomatic purposes.73 African 
states were particularly active in this field, especially when they used the 
threat of boycott. Countries of the developing world did occasionally attempt 
to challenge the Olympic Movement, for example in 1976 when Algeria and 
Cuba led a bid to take control of the Olympic Movement via UNESCO, but 
such activity was also associated with the communist bloc74 and much more 
modest than the GANEFO.
The GANEFO probably failed for several reasons. The fall of Sukarno 
was one of them, as the new authorities in Indonesia focused on restoring 
the economy rather than organising sports events. What is more, relations 
between China and Indonesia deteriorated, which led to diplomatic relations 
being broken in 1965.75 The Cultural Revolution in China is also believed 
to have had a negative effect on the GANEFO76 The “counterstrike” by 
the International Olympic Committee and sports federations also played 
a vital role in marginalising the GANEFO, and eventually the whole idea of 
a political alliance. It is also believed that allowing athletes who competed 
in the GANEFO to participate in IOC-affiliated events was a mistake.77 Of 
these the political reasons concerning the change of attitudes of China and 
Indonesia and the conflict between these countries appear to have had most 
impact of the demise of the GANEFO, as it is impossible to build an alliance 
without its centre. 
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Conclusion
This research has confirmed that the Games of New Emerging Forces 
were primarily an attempt to build a political alliance between the non-
aligned countries, as a third geopolitical bloc alongside the West and the 
Soviet sphere. The whole initiative was based on an ideological framework 
that was purely anti-Western, and to some extent open to communism.
It is difficult to define the main centre of this proposed alliance, as it 
was being developed simultaneously by communist China and Indonesia 
(a hypothesis confirmed by this paper). Both wished to lead the developing 
world, but this theoretical contradiction did not cause a conflict between 
them, at least until 1965. On the contrary, cooperation between them was very 
successful and full of positive gestures. Some authors have even claimed that 
the GANEFO was in fact meant to shape a Sino-Indonesian alliance, while 
others back the view that their closeness was simply a tool of furthering the 
goal of each, that is, of becoming the leader of the non-aligned countries.
It has also been observed that establishing a political alliance through 
the Games of New Emerging Forces was attempted in two ways. The first 
encompassed shaping closeness and solidarity between the engaged nations 
at a grassroots level, typical for public diplomacy. This was executed by 
various exchanges during the GANEFO. The other way included political 
cooperation between the countries that participated in the event, by creating 
a forum that was institutionalised by the Conference of the New Emerging 
Forces.
The Games of New Emerging Forces failed from both the sports and 
the political perspectives, and were eventually abandoned by China and 
Indonesia. It appears that political aspect was the most important reason for 
this failure, particularly the new approaches by China and Indonesia, and the 
conflict between them.
The developments around the GANEFO strongly resemble a power 
struggle typical for the Cold War period, but in this case it was between 
the developing world and international sport, the latter personified by the 
International Olympic Committee and international sports federations, which 
the GANEFO founders associated with the West. The Games of New Emerging 
Forces were obviously targeted against the Olympic Movement, which 
responded decisively and succeeded in marginalising the new initiative. The 
International Olympic Committee and other international sports governing 
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bodies not only acted as fully-fledged players in international relations, but 
also appear to have succeeded in their conflict against a state-run initiative. 
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